

ADDRESS TO THE GEOGRAPHICAL SECTION OF
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By JOHN MCFARLANE, M.A., President of the Section

Since the last meeting of the British Association, Treaties of Peace have been signed with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey; and, although there is still much which is unsettled, especially in the East, it is now possible to obtain some idea of the changes wrought on the map of Europe by the Great War. These changes are indeed of the most profound and far-reaching description. Old States have in some cases either disappeared or suffered an enormous loss of territory, and new States, with the very names of which we are but vaguely familiar, have been brought into existence. It has seemed to me, therefore, that it might not be altogether inappropriate to inquire into the principles upon which these territorial changes have been made, and to consider how far the political units affected by them possess the elements of stability. A learned but pessimistic historian to whom I confided my intention shook his head and gravely remarked, "Whatever you say on that subject will be writ in water." But the more I consider the matter the more do I feel convinced that certain features in the reconstructed Europe are of great and even of permanent value, and it is in that belief that I have ventured to disregard the warning which was given me.

In the rearrangement of European States which has taken place, geographical conditions have perhaps not always had the consideration which they deserve, but in an inquiry such as that upon which we are engaged they naturally occupy the first place. And by geographical conditions I am not thinking primarily, or even mainly, of defensive frontiers. It may be true, as Sir Thomas Holdich implies, that they alone form the true limits of a State. But if they do we ought to carry our theory to its logical conclusion and crown them with barbed-wire entanglements. Whether mankind would be happier or even safer if placed in a series of gigantic com-

pounds I greatly doubt. It is to the land within the frontier, and not to the frontier itself, that our main consideration should be given. The factors which we have to take into account are those which enable a people to lead a common national life, to develop the economic resources of the region within which they dwell, to communicate freely with other peoples, and to provide not only for the needs of the moment, but as far as possible for those arising out of the natural increase of the population.

The principle of self-determination has likewise played an important, if not always a well-defined, part in the rearrangement of Europe. The basis upon which the new nationalities have been constituted is on the whole ethnical, though it is true that within the main ethnical divisions advantage has been taken of the further differentiation in racial characteristics arising out of differences in geographical environment, history, language, and religion. But no more striking illustration could be adduced of the strength of ethnic relationships at the present time than the union of the Czechs with the Slovaks, or of the Serbs with the Croats and the Slovenes. Economic considerations, of course, played a great part in the settlement arrived at with Germany, but on the whole less weight has been attached to them than to ethnic conditions. In cases where they have been allowed to influence the final decision the result arrived at has not always been a happy one. Nor can more be said for those cases where the motive was political or strategic. Historical claims, which have been urged mainly by Powers anxious to obtain more than that to which they are entitled on other grounds, may be regarded as the weakest of all claims to the possession of new territory.

When we come to examine the application of the principles which I have indicated to the settlement of Europe we shall, I think, find that the promise of stability is greatest in those cases where geographical and ethnical conditions are most in harmony, and least where undue weight has been given to conditions which are neither geographical nor ethnical.

The restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France has always been treated as a foregone conclusion in the event of a successful termination of the war against Germany. From the geographical point of view, however, there are certainly objections to the inclusion of Alsace within French territory.

The true frontier of France in that region is the Vosges, not necessarily because they form the best defensive frontier, but because Alsace belongs to the Rhineland, and the possession of it brings France into a position from which trouble with Germany may arise in the future.

Nor can French claims to Alsace be justified on ethnical grounds. The population of the region contains a strong Teutonic element, as indeed does that of Northern France, and the language spoken by over 90 per cent. of the people is German. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that during the period between the annexation of Alsace by France in the seventeenth century and its annexation by Germany in the nineteenth French policy appears to have been highly successful in winning over the sympathies of the Alsations, just as between 1871 and 1914 German policy was no less successful in alienating them. The restoration of Alsace must therefore be defended, if at all, on the ground that its inhabitants are more attached to France than to Germany. That attachment it will be necessary for France to preserve in the future, as economic conditions are not altogether favourable. The cotton industry of Alsace may perhaps attach itself to that of France without great difficulty; but the agricultural produce of the Rhine plain will as before be likely to find its best and more convenient market in the industrial regions of Germany.

With regard to Lorraine the position is somewhat different. Physically that region belongs in the main to the country of the Paris basin, and is therefore in a sense part of France. Strategically it commands the routes which enter France from Germany between Belgium and the Vosges, and from that point of view its possession is of the utmost importance to her. Of the native population about one-third speak French, and the German element is mainly concentrated in the more densely populated districts of the north-east. But although in these various aspects Lorraine may be regarded as belonging to France in a sense which Alsace does not, the real argument for the restoration of the ceded provinces is in both cases the same. Lorraine, no less than Alsace, is French in its civilisation and in its sympathies.

From the economic point of view, however, the great deposits of iron ore in Lorraine constitute its chief attraction for France to-day, just as they appear to have constituted its

chief attraction for Germany half a century ago. But the transfer of the province from Germany, which has built up a great industry on the exploitation of its mines, to France, which does not possess in sufficient abundance coal for smelting purposes, together with other arrangements of a territorial or quasi-territorial nature made partly at least in consequence of this transfer, at once raises questions as to the extent to which the economic stability of Germany is threatened. The position of that country with regard to the manufacture of iron and steel will be greatly affected, for not only does she lose, in Lorraine and the Saar, regions in which these manufactures were highly developed, but she loses in them the sources from which other manufacturing regions still left to her, notably the Ruhr, drew considerable quantities either of raw materials or of semi-manufactured goods. For example, in 1913 the Ruhr, which produced over 40 per cent. of the pig iron of the German Empire, obtained 15 per cent. of its iron ore from Lorraine, and it also obtained from there and from the Saar a large amount of pig iron for the manufacture of steel. Unless, therefore, arrangements can be made for a continued supply of these materials a number of its industrial establishments will have to be closed down.

In regard to coal, the position is also serious. We need not, perhaps, be unduly impressed by the somewhat alarmist attitude of Mr. Keynes, who estimates that on the basis of the 1913 figures Germany, as she is now constituted, will require for the pre-war efficiency of her railways and industries an annual output of 110,000,000 tons, and that instead she will have in future only 102,000,000 tons, of which 40,000,000 will be mortgaged to the Allies. In arriving at these figures Mr. Keynes has made an allowance of 18,000,000 tons for decreased production, one half of which is caused by the German miner having shortened his shift from eight and a half to seven hours per day. This is certainly a deduction which we need not take into account. Mr. Keynes also leaves out of his calculation the fact that previous to the war about 10,000,000 tons per year were sent from Upper Silesia to other parts of Germany, and there is no reason to suppose that this amount need be greatly reduced, especially in view of Article 90 of the Treaty of Versailles, which provides that "for a period of fifteen years Poland will permit the produce of the mines of Upper Silesia to be available for sale to purchasers in Ger-

many on terms as favourable as are applicable to like products sold under similar conditions in Poland or in any other country." We have further to take into account the opportunities for economy in the use of coal, the reduction in the amount which will be required for bunkers, the possibility of renewing imports from abroad—to a very limited extent indeed, but still to some extent—and the fact that the French mines are being restored more rapidly than at one time appeared possible. (On the basis of the production of the first four months of 1920 Germany could already reduce her Treaty obligations to France by 1,000,000 tons per year.) Taking all these facts into account, it is probably correct to say that when Germany can restore the output of the mines left to her to the 1913 figure, she will, as regards her coal supply for industrial purposes, be in a position not very far removed from that in which she was in 1910, when her total consumption, apart from that at the mines, was about 100,000,000 tons.

The actual arrangements which have been made, it is true, are in some cases open to objection. The Saar is not geographically part of France, and its inhabitants are German by race, language, and sympathy. It is only in the economic necessities of the situation that a defence, though hardly a justification, of the annexation of the coalfield can be found. The coal from it is to be used in the main for the same purposes as before, whereas if it had been left to Germany much of it might have been diverted to other purposes. In 1913 the total production of Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar amounted to about 18,000,000 tons, while their consumption was about 14,000,000 tons. There is apparently a net gain to France of about 4,000,000 tons, but from that must be deducted the amount which the North-East of France received from this field in pre-war days. Switzerland also will probably in future continue to draw part of its supplies from the Saar.

The stipulation that Germany should for ten years pay part of her indemnities to France, Belgium, and Italy in kind also indicates an attempt to preserve the pre-war distribution of coal in Europe, though in some respects the scales seem to have been rather unfairly weighted against Germany. France, for example, requires a continuance of Westphalian coal for the metallurgical industries of Lorraine and the Saar, while Germany requires a continuance of Lorraine ore if her iron-

works on the Ruhr are not to be closed down. There was therefore nothing unreasonable in the German request that she should be secured her supplies of the latter commodity. Indeed, it would have been to the advantage of both countries if a clause similar to Article 90, which I have already quoted, had been inserted in the Treaty. It is true that temporary arrangements have since been made which will ensure to Germany a considerable proportion of her pre-war consumption of minette ores. But some agreement which enabled the two separate but complementary natural regions of the Saar and the Ruhr to exchange their surplus products on a business basis would have tended to an earlier restoration of good feeling between the two countries.

One other question which arises in this connection is the extent to which the steel industry of Germany will suffer by the loss of the regions from which she obtained the semi-manufactured products necessary for it. On this subject it is dangerous to prophesy, but when we take into consideration the length of time required for the construction of modern steelworks, the technical skill involved in their management, and the uncertainties with regard to future supplies of fuel, it seems unlikely that France will attempt any rapid development of her steel industry. In that case the Ruhr will still continue to be an important market for Lorraine and the Saar.

Our general conclusion, then, is that the territorial arrangements which have been made do not necessarily imperil the economic stability of Germany. The economic consequences of the war are really much more serious than the economic consequences of the peace. Germany has for ten years to make good the difference between the actual and the pre-war production of the French mines which she destroyed. Her own miners are working shorter hours, and as a result her own production is reduced, and as British miners are doing the same she is unable to import from this country. For some years these deductions will represent a loss to her of about 40,000,000 tons per annum, and will undoubtedly make her position a serious one. But to give her either the Saar or the Upper Silesian coalfields would be to enable her to pass on to others the debt which she herself has incurred. The reduction of her annual deliveries of coal to France, Belgium, and Italy was, indeed, the best way in which to show mercy to her.

The position of Poland is geographically weak, partly because its surface features are such that the land has no well-marked individuality, and partly because there are on the east and west no natural boundaries to prevent invasion or to restrain the Poles from wandering far beyond the extreme limits of their State. Polish geographers themselves appear to be conscious of this geographical infirmity, as Vidal de la Blache would have termed it, and in an interesting little work Nalkowski has endeavoured to show that the very transitionality of the land between east and west entitles it to be regarded as a geographical entity. But transitionality is rather the negation of geographical individuality than the basis on which it may be established. And indeed no one has pointed out its dangers more clearly than Nalkowski himself. "The Polish people," he says, "living in this transitional country always were, and still are, a prey to a succession of dangers and struggles. They should be ever alert and courageous, remembering that on such a transitional plain, devoid of strategic frontiers, racial boundaries are marked only by the energy and civilisation of the people. If they are strong they advance those frontiers by pushing forward; by weakening and giving way they promote their contraction. So the mainland may thrust out arms into the sea, or, being weak, may be breached and even overwhelmed by the ocean floods." If we bear in mind the constant temptation to a people which is strong to advance its political no less than its racial frontiers, and the constant danger to which a weakening people is exposed of finding its political frontier contract even more rapidly than its racial, we shall realise some of the evils to which a State basing its existence on transitionality is exposed.

It is, then, to racial feeling, rather than to geographical environment, that we must look for the basis of the new Polish State, but the intensity with which this feeling is likely to operate varies considerably in different parts of the region which it is proposed to include. In the plébiscite area of Upper Silesia there were, according to the census of 1900, which is believed to represent the facts more accurately than that of 1910, seven Poles to three of other nationalities. In Prussian Poland, apart from the western districts which have not been annexed to Poland and the town and district of Bromberg, the Poles number at least 75 per cent. of the total population, and in the ceded and plébiscite areas of East and

West Prussia 52 per cent. Russian Poland, which contains rather more than two-thirds of the entire population of what we may call ethnic Poland, has 9,500,000 Poles and over 3,000,000 Jews, Germans, Lithuanians, and others, while West Galicia is almost solidly Polish. Thus out of a total population of 21,000,000 within the regions mentioned the Poles number 15,500,000, or about 75 per cent.

Bearing these facts in mind, it is possible to consider the potentialities of the new State. The population is sufficiently large and the Polish element within it is sufficiently strong to justify its independence on ethnical grounds. Moreover, the alien elements which it contains are united neither by racial ties nor by contiguity of settlement. In Posen, for example, there is in the part annexed by Poland a definitely Polish population with a number of isolated German settlements, while in Russian Poland the Jews are to be found mainly in the towns. Considered as a whole, Poland is at least as pure racially as the United States.

When we consider the economic resources of Poland we see that they also make for a strong and united State. It is true that in the past the country has failed to develop as an economic unit, but this is a natural result of the partitions and of the different economic systems which have prevailed in different regions. Even now, however, we can trace the growth of two belts of industrial activity which will eventually unite these different regions together. One is situated on the coal-field running from Oppeln in Silesia by Cracow and Lemberg, and is engaged in mining, agriculture, and forestry; while the other extends from Posen by Lodz to Warsaw, and has much agricultural wealth and an important textile industry. Moreover, the conditions, geographical and economic, are favourable to the growth of international trade. If Poland obtains Upper Silesia she will have more coal than she requires, and the Upper Silesian fields will, as in the past, export their surplus product to the surrounding countries, while the manufacturing districts will continue to find their best markets in the Russian area to the east. The outlets of the State are good, for not only has it for all practical purposes control of the port of Danzig, but it is able to share in the navigation of the Oder and it has easy access to the south by way of the Moravian Gap.

It seems obvious, therefore, that Poland can best seek

compensation for the weakness of her geographical position by developing the natural resources which lie within her ethnic frontiers. By such a policy the different parts of the country will be more closely bound to one another than it is possible to bind them on a basis of racial affinity and national sentiment alone. Moreover, Poland is essentially the land of the Vistula, and whatever is done to improve navigation on that river will similarly tend to have a unifying effect upon the country as a whole. The mention of the Vistula, however, raises one point where geographical and ethnical conditions stand in marked antagonism to one another. The Poles have naturally tried to move down-stream to the mouth of the river which gives their country what little geographical individuality it possesses, and the Polish corridor is the expression of the movement. On the other hand, the peoples of East and West Prussia are one and the same. The geographical reasons for giving Poland access to the sea are no doubt stronger than the historical reasons for leaving East Prussia united to the remainder of Germany, but strategically the position of the corridor is as bad as it can be, and the solution arrived at may not be accepted as final.

Lastly, we may consider the case of East Galicia, which the Poles claim not on geographical grounds, because it is in reality part of the Ukraine, and not on ethnical grounds, because the great majority of the inhabitants are Little Russians, but on the ground that they are and have for long been the ruling race in the land. It may also be that they are not uninfluenced by the fact that the region contains considerable stores of mineral oil. But as the claim of the Poles to form an independent State is based on the fact that they form a separate race it is obviously unwise to weaken that claim by annexing a land which counts over 3,000,000 Ruthenes to one-third that number of Poles. Further, the same argument which the Poles use in regard to East Galicia could with no less reason be used by the Germans in Upper Silesia. Mr. Keynes, indeed, suggests that the Allies should declare that in their judgment economic conditions require the inclusion of the coal districts of Upper Silesia in Germany unless the wishes of the inhabitants are decidedly to the contrary. It is not improbable that East Galicia would give a more emphatic vote against Polish rule than Upper Silesia will give for it. If Poland is to ensure her position she must

forget the limits of her former empire, turn her back on the Russian plain, with all the temptations which it offers, and resolutely set herself to the development of the basin of the Vistula, where alone she can find the conditions which make for strength and safety.

Czecho-Slovakia is in various ways the most interesting country in the reconstructed Europe. Both geographically and ethnically it is marked by some features of great strength, and by others which are a source of considerable weakness to it. Bohemia by its physical structure and its strategic position seems designed by Nature to be the home of a strong and homogeneous people. Moravia attaches itself more or less naturally to it, since it belongs in part to the Bohemian massif and is in part a dependency of that massif. Slovakia is Carpathian country, with a strip of the Hungarian plain. Thus, while Bohemia possesses great geographical individuality and Slovakia is at least strategically strong, Czecho-Slovakia as a whole does not possess geographical unity and is in a sense strategically weak, since Moravia, which unites the two upland wings of the State, lies across the great route which leads from the Adriatic to the plains of Northern Europe. The country might easily, therefore, be cut in two as the result of a successful attack, either from the north or from the south. Later I shall endeavour to indicate certain compensations arising out of this diversity of geographical features, but for the moment at least they do not affect our argument.

We have, further, to note that the geographical and ethnical conditions are not altogether concordant. In Bohemia there is in the basin of the Eger in the north-west an almost homogeneous belt of German people, and on the north-eastern and south-western borderlands there are also strips of country in which the Germanic element is in a considerable majority. It is no doubt true, as Mr. Wallis has shown, that the Czechs are increasing in number more rapidly than the Germans, but on ethnical grounds alone there are undoubtedly strong reasons for detaching at least the north-western district from the Czecho-Slovak State. We feel justified in arguing, however, that here at least the governing factors are and must be geographical. To partition a country which seems predestined by its geographical features to be united and independent would give rise to an intolerable sense of injustice. I do not regard the matter either from the

strategic or from the economic point of view, though both of these are no doubt important. What I have in mind is the influence which the geographical conditions of a country exercise upon the political ideas of its inhabitants. It is easy to denounce, as Mr. Toynbee does, "the pernicious doctrine of natural frontiers," but they will cease to appeal to the human mind only when mountain and river, highland and plain cease to appeal to the human imagination. With good sense on both sides the difficulties in this particular case are not insurmountable. The Germans of Eger valley, which is known as German Bohemia, have never looked to Germany for leadership nor regarded it as their home, and their main desire has hitherto been to form a separate province in the Austrian Empire. A liberal measure of autonomy might convert them into patriotic citizens, and if they would but condescend to learn the Czech language they might come to play an important part in the government of the country.

In Slovakia also there are racial differences. Within the mountain area the Slovaks form the great majority of the population, but in the valleys, and on the plains of the Danube to which the valleys open out, the Magyar element predominates. Moreover, it is the Magyar element which is racially the stronger, and before which the Slovaks are gradually retiring. Geographical and ethnical conditions therefore unite in fixing the political frontier between Magyar and Slovak at the meeting place of hill and plain. But on the west such a frontier would have been politically inexpedient because of its length and irregularity, and economically disadvantageous because the river valleys, of which there are about a dozen, would have had no easy means of communication with one another or with the outside world. Hence the frontier was carried south to the Danube, and about 1,000,000 Magyars were included in the total population of 3,500,000. Nor is the prospect of assimilating these Magyars particularly bright. The Germans in Bohemia are cut off from the Fatherland by mountain ranges, and, as we have seen, it does not appear to present any great attraction to them. It is otherwise in Slovakia, where the Magyars of the lowland live in close touch with those of the Alfold, and it may be long ere they forget their connection with them. The danger of transferring territory not on geographical or ethnical, but on economic, grounds could not be more strikingly illustrated.

With regard to economic development, the future of the new State would appear to be well assured. Bohemia and Moravia were the most important industrial areas in the old Austrian Empire, and Slovakia, in addition to much good agricultural land, contains considerable stores of coal and iron. But if Czecho-Slovakia is to be knit together into a political and economic unit, its communications will have to be developed. We have already suggested that the geographical diversity of the country offers certain compensation for its lack of unity, but these cannot be taken advantage of until its different regions are more closely knit together than they are at present. The north of Bohemia finds its natural outlet both by rail and water through German ports. The south-east of Bohemia and Moravia look towards Vienna. In Slovakia the railways, with only one important exception, converge upon Budapest. The people appear to be alive to the necessity of remedying this state of affairs, and no fewer than fifteen new railways have been projected, which, when completed, will unite Bohemia and Moravia more closely to one another and Slovakia. Moreover, it is proposed to develop the waterways of the country by constructing a canal from the Danube at Pressburg to the Oder. From this canal another will branch off at Prerau and run to Pardubitz on the Elbe, below which point that river has still to be canalised. If these improvements are carried out the position of Czecho-Slovakia will, for an inland State, be remarkably strong. It will have through communication by water with the Black Sea, the North Sea, and the Baltic, and some of the most important land routes of the Continent already run through it. On the other hand, its access to the Adriatic is handicapped by the fact that in order to reach that sea its goods will have to pass through the territory of two, if not of three, other States, and however well the doctrine of economic rights of way may sound in theory, there are undoubted drawbacks to it in practice. Even with the best intentions, neighbouring States may fail to afford adequate means of transport through defective organisation, trade disputes, or various other reasons. It is probable, therefore, that the development of internal communications will in the end be to the advantage of the German ports, and more especially of Hamburg. But the other outlets of the State will certainly tend towards the preservation of its economic independence.

The extent to which Rumania has improved her position as a result of the war is for the present a matter of speculation. On the one hand she has added greatly to the territory which she previously held, and superficially she has rendered it more compact; but on the other she has lost her unity of outlook, and strategically at least weakened her position by the abandonment of the Carpathians as her frontier. Again, whereas before the war she had a fairly homogeneous population—probably from 90 to 95 per cent. of the 7,250,000 people in the country being of Rumanian stock—she has, by the annexation of Transylvania, added an area of 22,000 square miles of territory, in which the Rumanians number less than one and a half out of a total of two and two-third millions. In that part of the Banat which she has obtained there is also a considerable alien element. It is in this combination of geographical division and ethnic intermixture that we may foresee a danger to Rumanian unity. That part of the State which is ethnically least Rumanian is separated from the remainder of the country by a high mountain range, and in its geographical outlook no less than in the racial sympathies of a great number of its inhabitants is turned towards the west, while pre-war Rumania remains pointed towards the south-east. Economically also there is a diversity of interest, and the historical tie is perhaps the most potent factor in binding the two regions together. It is not impossible, therefore, that two autonomous States may eventually be established, more or less closely united according to circumstances.

The position in the Dobruja is also open to criticism. Geographically the region belongs to Bulgaria, and the Danube will always be regarded as their true frontier by the Bulgarian people. Ethnically its composition is very mixed, and whatever it was originally, it certainly was not a Rumanian land. But after the Rumanians had rather unwillingly been compelled to accept it in exchange for Bessarabia, filched from them by the Russians, their numbers increased and their economic development of the region, and more especially of the port of Constanza, undoubtedly gave them some claims to the northern part of it. As so often happens, however, when a country receives part of a natural region beyond its boundaries, Rumania is fertile in excuses for annexing more of the Dobruja. To the southern part, which she received after the Balkan wars, and in the possession of which she has

been confirmed by the peace terms with Bulgaria, she has neither ethnically nor economically any manner of right. The southern Dobruja is a fertile area which, before its annexation, formed the natural hinterland of the ports of Varna and Ruschuk. Her occupation of it will inevitably draw Rumania on to further intervention in Bulgarian affairs.

The arrangements which have been made with regard to the Banat must be considered in relation to the Magyar position in the Hungarian plain. The eastern country of the Banat, Krasso-Szörény, has a population which is in the main Rumanian, and as it belongs to the Carpathian area it is rightly included with Transylvania in Rumanian territory. In the remainder of the Banat, including Arad, the Rumanians form less than one-third of the total population, which also comprises Magyars, Germans, and Serbs. The Hungarian plain is a great natural region, capable of sub-division no doubt, but still a great natural region, in which the Magyar element is predominant. The natural limit of that plain is the mountain region which surrounds it, and to that limit at least the Magyar political power will constantly press. But Rumania has been permitted to descend from the mountains and Jugo-Slavia to cross the great river which forms her natural boundary, and both have obtained a foothold on the plain where it may be only too easy for them to seek occasion for further advances. And it cannot be urged that the principle of self-determination would have been violated by leaving the Western Banat to the Magyars. No plébiscite was taken, and it is impossible to say how the German element would have given what in the circumstances would have been the determining vote. Finally, as it was necessary to place nearly a million Magyars in Transylvania under Rumanian rule, it might not have been altogether expedient to leave some Rumanians on Hungarian soil.

For the extension of Jugo-Slavia beyond the Danube two pleas have been advanced, one ethnical and the other strategic. Neither is really valid. It is true that there is a Serbian area to the north of Belgrade, but the total number of Serbs within the part assigned to Jugo-Slavia probably does not much exceed 300,000. The strategic argument that the land which they occupy is necessary for the defence of the capital is equally inconclusive. From the military point of view it does not easily lend itself to defensive operations, and when we consider

the political needs of the country we cannot avoid the conclusion that a much better solution might have been found in the removal of the capital to some more central position. The Danube is certainly a better defensive frontier than the somewhat arbitrary line which the Supreme Council has drawn across the Hungarian plain.

In fact, it is in the treatment of the Hungarian plain that we feel most disposed to criticise the territorial settlements of the Peace Treaties. Geographical principles have been violated by the dismemberment of a region in which the Magyars were in a majority, and in which they were steadily improving their position. Ethnical principles have been violated, both in the north, where a distinctly Magyar region has been added to Slovakia, and in the south where the eastern Banat and Backa have been divided between the Rumanians and the Jugo-Slavs, who together form a minority of the total population. For the transfer of Arad to Rumania and of the Burgenland to Austria more is to be said, but the position as a whole is one of unstable equilibrium, and can only be maintained by support from without. In this part of Europe at least a League of Nations will not have to seek for its troubles.

When we turn to Austria we are confronted with the great tragedy in the reconstruction of Europe. Of that country it could once be said "*Bella gerant alii, tu felix Austria nube*," but to-day, when dynastic bonds have been loosened, the constituent parts of the great but heterogeneous empire which she thus built up have each gone its own way. And for that result Austria itself is to blame. She failed to realise that an empire such as hers could only be permanently retained on a basis of common political and economic interest. Instead of adopting such a policy, however, she exploited rather than developed the subject nationalities, and to-day their economic, no less than their political, independence of her is vital to their existence. Thus it is that the Austrian capital, which occupies a situation unrivalled in Europe, and which before the war numbered over 2,000,000 souls, finds herself with her occupation gone. For the moment Vienna is not necessary either to Austria or to the so-called Succession States, and she will not be necessary to them until she again has definite functions to perform. I do not overlook the fact that Vienna is also an industrial city, and that it, as well as various other

towns in Lower Austria, are at present unable to obtain either raw materials for their industries or foodstuffs for their inhabitants. But there are already indications that this state of affairs will shortly be ameliorated by economic treaties with the neighbouring States. And what I am particularly concerned with is not the temporary but the permanent effects of the change which has taken place. The entire political re-orientation of Austria is necessary if she is to emerge successfully from her present trials, and such a re-orientation must be brought about with due regard to geographical and ethnical conditions. The two courses which are open to her lead in opposite directions. On the one hand she may become a member of a Danubian confederation, on the other she may throw in her lot with the German people. The first would really imply an attempt to restore the economic position which she held before the war, but it is questionable whether it is either possible or expedient for her to make such an attempt. A Danubian confederation will inevitably be of slow growth, as it is only under the pressure of economic necessity that it will be joined by the various nationalities of south-eastern Europe. The suggestions made by Mr. Asquith, Mr. Keynes, and others, for a compulsory free-trade union would, if carried into effect, be provocative of the most intense resentment among most, if not all, of the States concerned. But even if a Danubian confederation were established it does not follow that Austria would be able to play a part in it similar to that which she played in the Dual Monarchy. With the construction of new railways and the growth of new commercial centres it is probable that much of the trade with the south-east of Europe which formerly passed through Vienna will in future go to the east of that city. Even now Pressburg, or Bratislava, to give it the name by which it will hence be known, is rapidly developing at the expense alike of Vienna and Budapest. Finally, Austria has in the past shown little capacity to understand the Slav peoples, and in any case her position in what would primarily be a Slav confederation would be an invidious one. For these reasons we turn to the suggestion that Austria should enter the German Empire, which, both on geographical and ethnical grounds, would appear to be her proper place. Geographically she is German, because the bulk of the territory left to her belongs either to the Alpine range or to the Alpine foreland. It is only

when we reach the basin of Vienna that we leave the mid-world mountain system and look towards the south-east of Europe across the great Hungarian plain. Ethnically, of course, she is essentially German. Now although my argument hitherto has rather endeavoured to show that the transfer of territory from one State to another on purely economic grounds is seldom to be justified, it is equally indefensible to argue that two States which are geographically and ethnically related are not to be allowed to unite their fortunes because it would be to their interest to do so. And that it would be to their interest there seems little doubt. Austria would still be able to derive some of her raw materials and foodstuffs from the Succession States, and she would have, in addition, a great German area in which she would find scope for her commercial and financial activities. Even if Naumann were but playing the part of the Tempter, who said, "All these things will I give thee if thou wilt fall down and worship me," he undoubtedly told the truth when he said, "The whole of Germany is now more open to the Viennese crafts than ever before. The Viennese might make an artistic conquest extending to Hamburg and Danzig." But not only would Austria find a market for her industrial products in Germany, she would become the great trading centre between Germany and south-east Europe, and in that way would once more be, but in a newer and better sense than before, the *Ostmark* of the German people.

The absorption of Austria in Germany is opposed by France, mainly because she cannot conceive that her great secular struggle with the people on the other side of the Rhine will ever come to an end, and she fears the addition of 6,500,000 to the population of her ancient enemy. But quite apart from the fact that Germany and Austria cannot permanently be prevented from following a common destiny if they so desire, and apart from the fact that politically it is desirable they should do so with at least the tacit assent of the Allied Powers rather than in face of their avowed hostility, there are reasons for thinking that any danger to which France might be exposed by the additional man-power given to Germany would be more than compensated for by the altered political condition in Germany herself. Vienna would form an effective counterpoise to Berlin, and all the more so because she is a great geographical centre, while Berlin is

more or less a political creation. The South German people have never loved the latter city, and to-day they love her less than ever. In Vienna they would find not only a kindred civilisation with which they would be in sympathy, but a political leadership to which they would readily give heed. In such a Germany, divided in its allegiance between Berlin and Vienna, Prussian animosity to France would be more or less neutralised. Nor would Germany suffer disproportionately to her gain, since in the intermingling of Northern efficiency with Southern culture she would find a remedy for much of the present discontents. When the time comes, and Austria seeks to ally herself with her kin, we hope that no impassable obstacle will be placed in her way.

The long and as yet unsettled controversy on the limits of the Italian Kingdom illustrates very well the difficulties which may arise when geographical and ethnical conditions are subordinated to considerations of military strategy, history, and sentiment in the determination of national boundaries. The annexation of the Alto Adige has been generally accepted as inevitable. It is true that the population is German, but here, as in Bohemia, geographical conditions appear to speak the final word. Strategically also the frontier is good, and will do much to allay Italian anxiety with regard to the future. Hence, although ethnical conditions are to some extent ignored, the settlement which has been made will probably be a lasting one.

On the east the natural frontier of Italy obviously runs across the uplands from some point near the eastern extremity of the Carnic Alps to the Adriatic. The pre-war frontier was unsatisfactory for one reason because it assigned to Austria the essentially Italian region of the lower Isonzo. But once the lowlands are left on the west the uplands which border them on the east, whether Alpin or Karst, mark the natural limits of the Italian Kingdom, and beyond a position on them for strategic reasons the Italians have no claims in this direction except what they can establish on ethnical grounds. To these, therefore, we turn. In Carniola the Slovenes are in a large majority, and in Gorizia they also form the bulk of the population. On the other hand, in the town and district of Trieste the Italians predominate, and they also form a solid block on the west coast of Istria, though the rest of that country is peopled mainly by Slovenes. It seems to follow,

therefore, that the plains of the Isonzo, the district of Trieste, and the west coast of Istria, with as much of the neighbouring upland as is necessary to secure their safety and communications, should be Italian, and that the remainder should pass to the Jugo-Slavs. The so-called Wilson line, which runs from the neighbourhood of Tarvis to the mouth of the Arsa, met these requirements fairly well, though it placed from 300,000 to 400,000 Jugo-Slavs under Italian rule to less than 50,000 Italians, half of whom are in Fiume itself transferred to the Jugo-Slavs. Any additional territory must, by incorporating a larger alien element, be a source of weakness and not of strength to Italy. To Fiume the Italians have no claim beyond the fact that in the town itself they slightly outnumber the Croats, though in the double town of Fiume-Sushak there is a large Slav majority. Beyond the sentimental reasons which they urge in public, however, there is the economic argument, which, perhaps wisely, they keep in the background. So long as Trieste and Fiume belonged to the same empire the limits within which each operated were fairly well defined, but if Fiume become Jugo-Slav it will not only prove a serious rival to Trieste, but will prevent Italy from exercising absolute control over much of the trade of Central Europe. For Trieste itself Italy has in truth little need, and the present condition of that city is eloquent testimony of the extent to which it depended for its prosperity upon the Austrian and German Empires. In the interests, then, not only of Jugo-Slavia but of Europe generally, Fiume must not become Italian, and the idea of constituting it a Free State might well be abandoned. Its development is more fully assured as the one great port of Jugo-Slavia than under any other form of government.

With regard to Italian claims in the Adriatic, little need be said. To the Dalmatian coast Italy has no right either on geographical or on ethnical grounds, and the possession of Pola, Valona, and some of the islands gives her all the strategic advantages which she has reason to demand. But, after all, the only danger which could threaten her in the Adriatic would come from Jugo-Slavia, and her best insurance against that danger would be an agreement by which the Adriatic should be neutralised. The destruction of the Austro-Hungarian fleet offers Italy a great opportunity of which she would do well to take advantage.

Of the prospects of Jugo-Slavia it is hard to speak with any feeling of certainty. With the exception of parts of Croatia-Slavonia and of Southern Hungary, the country is from the physical point of view essentially Balkan, and diversity rather than unity is its most pronounced characteristic. From this physical diversity there naturally results a diversity in outlook which might indeed be all to the good if the different parts of the country were linked together by a well-developed system of communication. Owing to the structure of the land, however, such a system will take long to complete.

Ethnic affinity forms the real basis of union, but whether that union implies unity is another matter. It is arguable that repulsion from the various peoples—Magyars, Turks, and Austrians—by whom they have been oppressed, rather than the attraction of kinship, is the force which has brought the Jugo-Slavs together. In any case the obstacles in the way of the growth of a strong national feeling are many. Serb, Croat, and Slovene, though they are all members of the Slav family, have each their distinctions and characteristics which political differences may tend to exaggerate rather than obliterate. In Serbian Macedonia, again, out of a total population of 1,100,000, there are 400,000 to 500,000 people who, though Slavs, are Bulgarian in their sympathies, and between Serb and Bulgarian there will long be bitter enmity. Religious differences are not wanting. The Serbs belong to the Orthodox Church, but the Croats are Catholics, and in Bosnia there is a strong Mohammedan element. Cultural conditions show a wide range. The Macedonian Serb, who has but lately escaped from Turkish misrule, the untutored but independent Montenegrin, the Dalmatian, with his long tradition of Italian civilisation, the Serb of the kingdom, a sturdy fighter but without great political insight, and the Croat and Slovene, whose intellectual superiority is generally admitted, all stand on different levels in the scale of civilisation. To build up out of elements in many respects so diverse a common nationality without destroying what is best in each will be a long and laborious task. Economic conditions are not likely to be of much assistance. It is true that they are fairly uniform through Jugo-Slavia, and it is improbable that the economic interests of different regions will conflict to any great extent. On the other hand, since each region is more or less self-supporting, they will naturally unite into an

economic whole less easily than if there had been greater diversity. What the future holds for Jugo-Slavia it is as yet impossible to say ; but the country is one of great potentialities, and a long period of political rest might render possible the development of an important State.

This brings me to my conclusion. I have endeavoured to consider the great changes which have been made in Europe not in regard to the extent to which they do or do not comply with the canons of boundary-making, for after all there are no frontiers in Europe which can in these days of modern warfare be considered as providing a sure defence, but in regard rather to the stability of the States concerned. A great experiment has been made in the new settlement of Europe, and an experiment which contains at least the germs of success. But in many ways it falls far short of perfection, and even if it were perfect it could not be permanent. The methods which ought to be adopted to render it more equable and to adapt it to changing needs it is not for us to discuss here. But as geographers engaged in the study of the ever-changing relations of man to his environment we can play an important part in the formation of that enlightened public opinion upon which alone a society of nations can be established.

Review.

"The West Riding of Yorkshire." By BERNARD HOBSON, M.Sc., F.G.S., late Lecturer in Geology in the Victoria University of Manchester. Cambridge University Press, 1921. 3/6 net.

THIS is one of the latest of the series of county geographies, and most adequately maintains the high reputation for accuracy and thoroughness won by its predecessors. It is impossible to imagine a manual of such modest dimensions more compact with information. From the point of view of scientific interest, of its great industrial developments, its agricultural importance, the beauties of its scenery, its antiquities, its notable men and women and the part it has played in the national history, the West Riding may justly be regarded as one of the most important of the county divisions of England, and the present little volume contains the most compact information possible under all these heads. The pictures are particularly well chosen, and the list of chief towns and villages at the end is one of the fullest and most useful that we have noticed in any one of this series. M. G. H.